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Workers' Compensation
by EL Michael Bagley*
Daniel C. Kniffen"
and
John G. Blackmon, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

After the difficult debate surrounding workers' compensation
legislation in 1992, few would have thought it possible that the Georgia
Legislature would revisit the Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act")'
any time soon. Yet, the 1994 General Assembly made a number of
substantial changes to the Act, constituting by far the most significant
development in workers' compensation law over the survey period.
Important case law decisions affected the areas of exclusive remedy, the
employment relationship, and heart attack claims.
II.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

The General Assembly effected several major substantive changes to
the Workers' Compensation Act in 1994.2 Effective July 1, 1994, these
amendments to the Act were designed and sponsored by the Chairman
of the State Board of Workers' Compensation, Harrill Dawkins.3

* Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory University
(B.A., 1977); University of Georgia (J.D., 1980). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., magna cum laude, 1981; J.D., cum laude, 1984). Member, Mercer Law Review (19821984); Editor in Chief (1983-1984). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Partner in the firm of Drew, Ecki & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. The Citadel (B.S.,
1976); Mercer University (J.D, cum laude, 1986). Member, Mercer Law Review (19841986). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 1994 Ga. Laws 887.
2. Id. All changes became effective July 1, 1994 in conjunction with extensive changes
to Board Rules.
3. Id.
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A.

Aggravation of Preexisting Condition
While the definition of "injury" and "personal injury" set out in the
Workers' Compensation Act made no mention of the aggravation of a
preexisting condition prior to 1994, it has long been a well-established
principle that the aggravation of a preexisting condition by employment
activities is viewed as an injury arising out of and in the course of
employment.4 The judicial inclusion of "aggravation of a preexisting
condition" into the definition of "injury" and "personal injury" was
codified in 1994.'
Similarly, the General Assembly codified the well-established principle
that the aggravation of a preexisting condition by an injury arising out
of and in the course of employment is compensable only for so long as
the condition is aggravated.6 While the definition of injury and personal
injury were specifically amended to include aggravation of a preexisting
condition, the amendment also restricted the inclusion "only for so long
as the aggravation of the preexisting condition continues to be the cause
of the disability; the preexisting condition shall no longer meet this
criteria when the aggravation ceases to be the cause of the disability."7
In other words, not only will the employee's entitlement to disability
benefits cease, but the employee shall no longer be entitled to medical
care as well, since the entire claim ceases to be compensable.

B.

Accidents Caused by Alcohol and Controlled Substances
It is well-settled that injuries which are proximately caused by an
employee's intoxication as a result of the consumption of alcohol or
controlled substances are barred as wilful misconduct! However, since
this is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof has been on the
employer, and the practicalities of amassing all of the evidence needed
are all too often insurmountable.
In order to facilitate the fair and efficient administration of claims
involving employees under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time
of their on-the-job injury, Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")

4. See, e.g., Henry Gen. Hosp. v. Stephens, 189 Ga. App. 619, 376 S.E.2d 705 (1988);
Mallory v. American Casualty, Co., 114 Ga. App. 641, 152 S.E.2d 592 (1966).
5. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (Supp. 1994).
6. Leatherby Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 142 Ga. App. 476,236 S.E.2d 168 (1977); cf, Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Moss, 197 Ga. App. 61, 397 S.E.2d 445 (1990).
7. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (Supp. 1994).
8. City of Buford v. Thomas, 179 Ga. App. 769, 347 S.E.2d 713 (1986); Parks v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 69 Ga. App. 720, 26 S.E.2d 562 (1943).
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section 34-9-179 was amended in 1994 to parallel the criminal provisions
applicable to individuals charged with driving motor vehicles under the
influence of alcohol or drugs.'0
The burden-shifting presumptions
created in the statutory framework for dealing with individuals charged
with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs have withstood
constitutional challenges based upon an alleged denial of due process of
law and have been found to be a valid and enforceable evidentiary
tool."
A rebuttable presumption that the accident and injury were caused by
the consumption of alcohol is created "if the amount of alcohol in the
employee's blood within three hours of the time of the alleged accident,
as shown by chemical analysis of the employee's blood, urine, breath or
"...12 Similarly, if
other bodily substance, is 0.08 grams or greater .
"any amount of marijuana or controlled substance" is found in the
employee's blood within eight hours of the time of the accident, as shown
by chemical analysis of blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance, a
rebuttable presumption is created that the accident and injury were
caused by the ingestion of the drug."
Previously, evidence confirming the mere ingestion of alcohol or
controlled substances, without more, was not sufficient to mount a
defense based upon the wilful misconduct of the employee. 4 In the
situations specified by this amendment, the burden of moving forward
will be upon the employee, and the employee will be confronted with the
task of essentially disproving that the alcohol or controlled substances
15
were the proximate cause of the on-the-job accident and injury.
Anticipating possible attempts to foil the testing requirements of these
provisions, the statute also provides that if the employee unjustifiably
refuses to submit to a reliable, scientific test to be performed in
compliance with drug-free workplace programs, 6 then the same

9. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-17 (Supp. 1994).
10. Id. § 40-6-392 (1991).
11. Lattarulo v. State, 261 Ga. 124, 401 S.E.2d 516 (1991); Melton v. State, 175 Ga.
App. 472, 333 S.E.2d 682 (1985); Olsen v. State, 168 Ga. App. 296, 308 S.E.2d 703 (1983).
12. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-17(b)(1) (Supp. 1994).
13. Id. § 34-9-17(bX2).
14. See, e.g., Thomas v. Helen's Roofing Co., 199 Ga. App. 161, 404 S.E.2d 331 (1991).
The court of appeals noted that the existence of cocaine in the bloodstream, without specific
evidence of intoxication causing the injury, would not be sufficient to bar the claim. Id. at
161, 404 S.E.2d at 331.
15. O.C.GA. § 34-9-17(c) (Supp. 1994).
16. Id. § 34-9-415.
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rebuttable presumption that the accident or injury was caused by the
consumption of alcohol or controlled substances shall arise."l
C.

Penalty Provisions
The State Board of Workers' Compensation ("Board") has long
possessed the authority to administer penalties for the failure to file
forms or to follow orders or directives; in addition, the Board may
administer penalties upon violation of any rule or regulation."8 The
authority of the Board to administer penalties was expanded in 1994 to
include the power to assess a civil penalty of not less than $500 and no
more than $5,000 per violation against any person who knowingly and
intentionally makes any false or misleading statement or representation
for the purpose of facilitating the obtaining or denying of any benefit or
payment under the Act.19 Likewise, the Board has the same authority
for violations of the provisions requiring employers to obtain workers'
compensation insurance or qualify as a self-insured.'
D. Construction and Interpretationof the Act
Through judicial pronouncement, it has become axiomatic that the
Georgia Workers' Compensation Act is a "humanitarian measure meant
to provide relief to the injured employee, and the Act should be liberally
interpreted by the Courts to carry out that purpose." 21 However, the
underlying philosophy of interpreting the Act itself in a liberal manner
has frequently been used in practice as the basis for interpreting the
facts as well as the law in favor of a claimant, which is erroneous as a
matter of law.'
In an effort to more clearly define the manner in which the Act should
be construed and interpreted, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-23 restricts liberality
of construction to only the purposes of "bringing employers and
employees within the provisions of this chapter and to provide protection
for both."' Furthermore, for the first time in the history of the Act,
the General Assembly specified that the Act's intent is "to provide a
complete and exclusive system and procedure for the resolution of

17.
18.

Id. § 34-9-17(b)(3).
Id. § 34-9-18(a).

19. Id. § 34-9-18(b).

20. Id. § 34-9-18(c).
21. Little Suwanee Lumber Co. v. Fitzgerald, 172 Ga. App. 144, 322 S.E.2d 347 (1984);
see also Lee v. Claxton, 70 Ga. App. 226, 28 S.E.2d 87 (1943).
22. Georgia Power Co. v. Carter, 110 Ga. App. 233, 138 S.E.2d 182 (1964).
23.

O.C.G-. § 34-9-23 (Supp. 1994).
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However, the
disputes between employers and employees .... '
provision leaves no room for doubt that the Act "shall be construed and
applied impartially to both employers and employees.'
The essence of the General Assembly's message in O.C.G.A. section 349-23 is twofold. First, the workers' compensation system should be the
exclusive remedy for resolving disputes between employers and
employees for injuries to the employee which arise out of or in the course
of employment. Second, coverage by the Act is the only issue which
shall require liberal construction, and all issues other than coverage
under the Workers' Compensation Act shall be construed in a manner
which is impartial to both employers and employees.
E.

Qualificationsand Roles of Members of the Board

In a subtle change, acknowledging the reality of impartial Board
members, O.C.GA. section 34-942(a) was modified to change the
requirement that there be one member "considered a representative" of
employers and another member "considered a representative" of
employees to a requirement that each of those members be "knowledgeGone is the
able of the concerns" of either employers or employees.'
statutory requirement of an advocate on the Board for each side.
Instead, the Board shall have a designated member who is a resource of
knowledge and information.
This change is consistent with the judicial function of the Board, and
in furtherance of the judicial function of the Board, there is now the
statutory mandate that Board members shall be subject to the Georgia
Code of Judicial Conduct.27
F

Standardof Review by the Board

Prior to July 1, 1994, appeals to the full Board from an award of an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) were de novo proceedings. The full
Board had the authority to consider all evidence in the record and it was
not bound to follow any of the AL's findings of fact or conclusions of
law."
The General Assembly amended O.C.G.A. section 34-9-103(a) to
abolish de novo review by the Board of awards from ALJs. 2 After July

24. Id.
25. Id.

26. Id. 1 34-942(a).
27. Id. § 34-942(b). See Georgia Court and Bar Rules, Code of Judicial Conduct § 13-1
(1993).
28. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. West, 213 Ga. 296, 99 S.E.2d 89 (1957).

29. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-103(a) (Supp. 1994).
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1, 1994, the "findings of fact made by the Administrative Law Judge in
the Trial Division shall be accepted by the Appellate Division where
such findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of competent and
credible evidence contained within the records."30
A preponderance of evidence is defined in Georgia law as being where
the evidence shows that a certain fact is more likely true than not
true. 1 Therefore, in order to have the Full Board reverse a finding
made by an AIU, the appellant will be required to show that the finding
of fact made by the AIJ was at least based upon evidence which was
evenly balanced in support of each party's contention.3 2
G. Issues Related to the Employee's Return to Work
Aden's Minute Market v. Landon 3 and its progeny reemphasized the
burden that must be carried by an injured employee who has ceased
working for reasons unrelated to the on-the-job injury and seeks the
reinstitution of disability benefits.' The employee must not only show
the existence of continued physical limitations related to the on-the-job
injury, but must also show that the employee has made a good faith
effort to find other employment which is suitable to the employee's
impaired condition.
Not only must employees show that they have
applied for jobs, but employees must also show that they did not get the
jobs because of their impaired condition.'
In order to streamline this evidentiary process, the General Assembly
modified the rule against hearsay from potential employers to whom the
employee has applied for work, in the same manner as the rule against
hearsay has been modified for certain medical reports, 7 and the parties
may now submit into evidence a form "signed and dated by a prospective
employer... in lieu of the oral testimony of such prospective employer
... [to] document that the employee has applied for a position or
positions suitable to the employee's limitations or restrictions resulting
from the work-related injury and was not hired."'

30. 1d § 34-9-103(a).
31. Ladson Motor Co. v. Croft, 212 Ga. 275, 92 S.E.2d 103 (1956); Dixon v. VirginiaCarolina Chem. Co., 30 Ga. App. 78, 116 S.E. 662 (1923).
32.
33. 202 Ga. App. 219, 413 S.E.2d 738 (1991).
34. Id. at 219, 413 S.E.2d at 738. For a detailed discussion, see H. Michael Bagley et
al, Workers' Compensation,45 MERCER L. REV. 493, 504 (1993).
35. 202 Ga. App. at 219, 413 S.E.2d at 738.
36. State v. Bardge, 211 Ga. App. 307, 439 S.E.2d 1 (1993).
37. O.C.GA. § 34-9-102(e)(2) (Supp. 1994).
38. Id. § 34-9-102(eX3).

1994]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

In situations where the injured employee who continues to possess
limitations is offered a job that is suitable, the employee shall have
fifteen working days as a "trial return to work period" without experiencing a shift in the burden of proof if the employee's efforts to return to
work in that fifteen-day period are unsuccessful. 9 Benefits shall be
immediately reinstated and the burden of proof will remain upon the
employer to prove that the employee is not entitled to continuing
benefits in the event the employee is unable to perform the job for more
than fifteen days.' However, if the employee refuses to attempt the
job, the employer may unilaterally suspend benefits upon proof that the
job was approved by the authorized treating physician within sixty days
of the job offer, that the employee was given at least ten days notice of
the 4suitable
job, and certification that the employee did not attempt the
1
job.

H. Medical Benefits
The employer is required to provide employees who have been injured
on the job with medical benefits, which include "such medical, surgical,
and hospital care and other treatment, items, and services which are
prescribed by a licensed physician, including medical and surgical
supplies, artificial members, and prosthetic devices and aids damaged
or destroyed in a compensable accident." 2 The 1994 amendments to
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-201 allow employers to elect between three
different mechanisms for providing medical care: the traditional posted
panel, a conformed panel of physicians, or managed care organization
procedures.'
Traditional Posted Panel. The traditional posted panel of
physicians existed in essentially the same format for two decades before
the 1994 amendments, and it still exists as an option for employers to
use in providing medical services under the Workers' Compensation Act.
To utilize the traditional panel, the employer must maintain a list of
at least four physicians, professional associations, or corporations of
physicians, and an employee may select the services of the physicians on
the list if he is injured on the job." An employee challenging the

39.
40.

Id. § 34-9-240(b).
Id. § 34-9-240(b)(1).

41. Id. § 34-9-240(b)(2).
42.
43.

Id. § 34-9-200(a).
Id. § 34-9-201(b).
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validity of a panel of physicians must prove that the panel is defective.4 If the panel contains less than four physicians, does not list an
orthopaedic surgeon, or if more than two of the four medical providers
listed are industrial clinics, the panel will be considered defective.' In
such cases, the employee can seek treatment from a physician of the
employee's choice.4
After notice is given by the employee to the
employer, the physician selected becomes the authorized treating
physician, and the employee may make one change from that physician
to another physician without approval of the employer and without an
order of the Board.'
However, any further change of physician or
treatment requires a formal request to the Board or an agreement by the
parties.49
Conformed Panel. To utilize the conformed panel of physicians, the
employer must maintain a list of at least six physicians or professional
associations reasonably accessible to employees.'" In addition to the
four physician minimum required in the traditional posted panel of
physicians, conformed panel
status is achieved by adding a chiropractor
5
and a general surgeon. '
An employee may obtain the services of any physician from the
conformed panel and may thereafter also elect to change to another
physician on the panel without prior authorization within sixty days of
the date of first treatment for the injury.6 2 The physician selected will
then become the authorized treating physician in control of the
employee's medical care and may arrange for any consultation, referral,
and extraordinary or other specialized medical services as the nature of
the injury shall require without prior authorization of the Board.'
However, any physician to whom the employee is referred by the
primary authorized treating physician shall not be permitted to arrange
for additional referrals."
An employee challenging the validity of a conformed panel of
physicians must prove that the panel is defective." If the panel

45. Id.; Board Rule 201(aXl).

46. O.C.G.A. 34-9-201(b); Board Rule 201(cX1).
47. O.C.GA § 34-9-201(f) (Supp. 1994).

48.
49.
50.
51.

Board Rule 201(c) (Supp. 1994).
Id.
O.C.GA. § 34-9-201(bX2) (Supp. 1994); Board Rule 201(a)(2).
O.C.GA- § 34-9-201(bX2) (Supp. 1994); Board Rule 201(a)(2).

52.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(bX2) (Supp. 1994).

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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contains less than six physicians or does not contain providers of the
types of health care services required, the panel will be considered
defective.' In such cases, the employee can seek treatment from a
physician of the employee's choice."7 After notice is given by the
employee to the employer, the physician selected becomes the authorized
treating physician, and the employee may make one change from that
physician to another physician without approval of the employer and
without an order of the Board.'
Workers' Compensation Managed Care Organizations. An
employer or the workers' compensation insurer of an employer may
contract with a workers' compensation managed care organization
("WCMCO") certified by the Board.59 A WCMCO is a plan certified by
the Board that provides for the delivery and management of treatment
to injured employees under the Act.' The language of the statute
enabling the use of WCMCO's in Georgia borrows heavily from similar
1
provisions in the laws of Oregon" and Minnesota. 6
An employer utilizing a WCMCO in Georgia may satisfy the notice
requirements by posting notices in permanent places upon the business
premises which identify the WCMCO, give the effective date of the
contract with the WCMCO, as well as the WCMCO's geographical
service area, the telephone number and address of the administrator,
and the WCMCO's toll-free twenty-four-hour telephone number.' The
party who challenges the validity of the WCMCO panel shall have the
burden of proof."
Authorization by Referral. Whether utilizing a traditional posted
panel, a conformed posted panel, or a WCMCO, a referral by an
authorized treating physician for a specific ancillary treatment or
medical services does not constitute a change of physician and does not
require an order from the Board, but the physician receiving the patient
on referral has no authority to make any other referrals except back to
the original referring physician.' The referring physician remains the

56. Id.
57.

O.C.GA. § 34-9-201(f) (Supp. 1994).

58. Board Rule 201(c) (Supp. 1994).
59. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-208 (Supp. 1994).
60. Id. § 34-9-201(bX3).
61. OR. REV. STAT. § 656.260 (Supp. 1994).
62. MiNN. STAT. § 176.135 (1993).
63. Board Rule 201(aX3) (Supp. 1994).
64. Board Rule 201.
65. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(b) (Supp. 1994); Board Rule 201(a).
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authorized treating physician for all other purposes.' The employer's
liability for the medical expenses of the second physician is limited to
the treatment requested by the initial authorized treating physician. 7
Amendments to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-201 in 1994 overrule earlier
decisions requiring prior approval of the Board of all ancillary medical
services."
Change of Physician. If the employee wishes to go to a physician
not listed on the panel or in the WCMCO, the employee may make a
request for a change of physician." Likewise, if the employer is
dissatisfied with the treatment the employee is receiving and the
employee will not agree to seek other care, the employer may also make
a request for a change of physician.70 The 1994 amendments to the Act
gave the State Board the power to order a change of physician or
treatment upon its own motion, as well as upon the request of an
employer or employee, after the parties have been given fifteen days in
which to voice any opposition."
Medical Care in the Controverted Case. When an employer
controverts a claim, or denies that the employee has suffered a
compensable injury and that the employee is entitled to receive benefits,
the employer loses the right to control who provides medical care to the
employee.72 However, the employee's ability to select providers of
medical services is not unrestricted after a previously controverted claim
subsequently is found to be or accepted as compensable.73 Under these
circumstances, the employee is authorized to select one of the physicians
who had provided treatment for the work-related injury prior to the
finding or acceptance of compensability.7 4 After notice is given to the
employer, the physician so selected becomes the authorized treating
physician, and the employee may make one change from that physician
to another physician who had provided treatment for the work-related

66. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(B) (Supp. 1994).
67. Brown Transp. Corp. v. Holcombe, 171 Ga. App. 532, 320 S.E.2d 552 (1984), affd,
253 Ga. 719, 324 S.E.2d 446 (1985).
68. Capital Atlanta, Inc. v. Carroll, 213 Ga. App. 214, 444 S.E.2d 592 (1994); cf Lee
Fabricators v. Cook, 203 Ga. App. 540, 417 S.E.2d 35 (1992); Brown v. Transamerica, IMS,
200 Ga. App. 272, 407 S.E.2d 430 (1991).
69. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(e) (Supp. 1994).
70. Id.
71. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-200(b) and 34-9-201(e).
72. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(e).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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injury prior to the finding or acceptance of compensability, without
approval of the employer and without an order of the Board.7"
III.

EXCLUSiVE REMEDY

As in the last survey period, there were several decisions during this
survey period regarding the exclusive remedy doctrine.76
ProvidingMedical Care
Jim Walters Homes, Inc. v. Roberts,77 created controversy regarding
the exclusive remedy doctrine since it contained certain dicta which
generated the argument that delays in providing or authorizing medical
care could subject the employer or insurer to tort liability.7' The
authors previously opined in the 1993 survey that Jim Walters Homes
represented an anomaly in Georgia law.7 In Wall v. Phillips,' the
court of appeals emphasized this anomaly."1 In Wall a former employee
commenced a tort action against her former employer alleging that the
plant nurse prescribed pain medication without first obtaining authorization from her treating physician. 2 In response, the employer raised
the exclusive remedy provision of the Act," but the trial court denied
the employer's motion for summary judgment."' The court of appeals
reversed this denial, finding that the employer was entitled to summary
judgment since the exclusive remedy doctrine also applies to "intentional
torts committed by one worker against a co-worker, unless the tortious
act was committed for personal reasons unrelated to the conduct of the
More importantly, the court specifically
employer's business."'
distinguished the decision in Jim Walters Homes as follows:
A

Phillips misplaces her reliance upon Jim Walters Homes v. Roberts
.... In Jim Walter, a default case, the former employer was deemed
to have admitted to an intentional tort that was outside the purview
of the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act. Jim Walter thus has no
application to the instant case, where the nursing services were

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Board Rule 201(b) (Supp. 1994).
For a general overview, see Bagley et al, supra note 34, at 494.
196 Ga. App. 618, 396 S.E.2d 787 (1990).
Id. at 620-21, 396 S.E.2d at 789-90.
See Bagley et al, supra note 34, at 498.
210 Ga. App. 490, 436 S.E.2d 517 (1993).
Id. at 490, 436 S.E.2d at 517.
Id., 436 S.E.2d at 518.
Id. at 491, 436 S.E.2d at 518 (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a) (1992)).
Id. at 490, 436 S.E.2d at 518.
Id. at 491, 436 S.E.2d at 518.
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rendered at the workplace and solely because of Phillips' position as an
employee...
B.

IntentionalActs

In Hadsock v. J.H. Harvey Co.,"7 an employee was followed by a
fellow employee and an accomplice to a bank where the employee was
making a night deposit on behalf of his employer. The employee was
robbed and killed by the fellow employee and his accomplice.'
In a
tort action filed against the employer, summary judgment was granted
to the employer under the exclusive remedy doctrine, and the court of
appeals affirmed because it was undisputed that the employee had been
assigned the task by his supervisor." While the performance of the
task by the employee was clearly contrary to company policy, the
employee was not in a position to challenge the order.9 In extending
the exclusive remedy provision to this circumstance, the court made the
following observation on how to construe the Act:
The Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in
determining whether an injury is compensable under it. . . it must be
viewed in this manner both when an employee has made a claim and
is seeking coverage under it and when an employer has sought its
protection as a defense to a tort action. One of the purposes of the Act
is the humanitarian one of providing relief to injured employees, but
another 91
purpose is to protect employers against excessive recoveries of
damage.
In contrast with the decision in Hadsock, in Rogers v. Carmike
Cinemas," the court was confronted with an employee's allegation of
sexual harassment by company officers and employees. The employee
asserted in the complaint that she had to endure on almost a daily basis
harassing conversations involving sexual innuendo and sexual overtone,
as well as direct confrontations regarding sexual favors from Carmike's
officers and employees. At the conclusion of the employee's evidence, the
employer moved for directed verdict on the basis that the claims were
barred by the exclusive remedy doctrine of the Act." The employer's
motion for directed verdict was granted, but on appeal, the court of

86. Id. at 491-92, 436 S.E.2d at 519.
87. 212 Ga. App. 782, 442 S.E.2d 892 (1994).

88. Id. at 783, 442 S.E.2d at 894.
89. Id.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 783-84, 442 S.E.2d at 894.
Id. at 784, 442 S.E.2d at 894 (citations omitted).
211 Ga. App. 427, 439 S.E.2d 663 (1993).
Id. at 428-29, 439 S.E.2d at 664-65.
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appeals reversed on the basis that the Act excludes from coverage an
injury caused by the wilful act of a third person directed against an
employee for reasons personal to the employee and applied that principle
to the circumstances of the case. 94
Similarly, in Oliver v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,' summary judgment
had been granted to Wal-Mart Stores in an action brought by a former
employee claiming slander and intentional infliction of emotional
distress after being upset by her manager reading a counseling
statement to her following an allegation that she had taken a ten-cent
cup of ice without paying for it.' In refusing to extend the exclusive
remedy provision to this circumstance, the court found:
This court has held that to be compensable under the Act, the injury
must be a physical injury or harm. It is undisputed that the only
injury involved in this case is a non-physical one ....

We conclude

that since the only injury involved in this case is a non-physical one,
it is not one which is compensable under the Act."
However, the Supreme Court reached a different conclusion in Hennly
v. Richardson." A former employee filed a tort action alleging that her
supervisor had wilfully directed his pipe smoke at her with the intent to
inflict injury.99 The court of appeals had reversed the trial court's
grant of partial summary judgment based upon the court of appeals'
finding that the alleged conduct was not work-related and therefore not
barred by the exclusive remedy doctrine of the Act. 1" In reversing the
court of appeals, the Supreme Court found:
The injuries of which Richardson complains began and occurred while
she was at her place of employment during the regular work day and
were the result of the conditions under which she worked ....
Hennly's smoking was a part of that work environment, rather than an
act directed at Richardson personally.0 1
Further emphasizing the bright-line distinction between physical and
non-physical injury, Baldwin v. Roberts'02 stemmed from a tort action
brought by a former employee alleging that her former supervisor struck

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id See also Murphy v. ARA Servs., Inc., 164 Ga. App. 859,298 S.E.2d 528 (1982).
209 Ga. App. 703, 434 S.E.2d 500 (1993).
Id. at 703, 434 S.E.2d at 500.
Id. at 704, 434 S.E.2d at 500.
264 Ga. 355, 444 S.E.2d 317 (1994).

99. Id. at 355, 444 S.E.2d at 319-20.
100. Richardson v. Hennly, 209 Ga. App. 868, 434 S.E.2d 772 (1993).
101. 264 Ga. at 355, 444 S.E.2d at 320-21.
102. 212 Ga. App. 546, 442 S.E.2d 272 (1994).
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her in the face after she was escorted from the business premises.'0°
Although the employee alleged that the altercation was a result of
personal animosity, the court pointed out that while personal animosity
may have ultimately resulted, the origin of a dispute stemmed from the
performance of the employee's work, and as such, any battery claim
would be barred by the exclusive remedy doctrine.'
As to the
employee's further contention that the battery was not covered by the
Act because her employment had already been terminated at the time
it occurred, the court pointed out that since the aggressive acts "were
part of the res gestae of the [alleged] discharging of Black by Baldwin,
the injuries which resulted from those actions arose out of and in the
course of employment."0 5
C.

Entities Covered
The threshold consideration in determining whether or not the
exclusive remedy provision is applicable is whether or not there is an
employer-employee relationship.0 6 Coverage by the exclusive remedy
doctrine cannot be induced by unilateral payments of medical bills and
disability benefits to an independent contractor, as argued in Collins v.
Grafton."
While acknowledging that the law contemplates some
situations where the doctrine of estoppel might be utilized to bar
individuals from arguing that they are not covered by the provisions of
the Act, the court emphasized:
Unbridled application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be a

means by which the very purpose of the Act is thwarted.

The

successful continuation of the Workers' Compensation system requires

that studied caution be exercised before the doctrine of estoppel is
applied against an injured party who does nothing more than receive
compensation benefits voluntarily provided by an employer.'

Similarly, the exclusive remedy doctrine will not be extended to an
alleged co-employee simply because the alleged employer settles a
workers' compensation claim on a stipulation of no-coverage under the
Act.1o9

103.
104.
105.

Id. at 546, 442 S.E.2d at 272.
Id. at 54647, 442 S.E.2d at 274.
Id. at 547, 442 S.E.2d at 274.

106. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1992).
107.
108.
109.

263 Ga. App. 441, 435 S.E.2d 37 (1993).
Id. at 444, 435 S.E.2d at 40.
Heffiey v. Adkins, 209 Ga. App. 736, 434 S.E.2d 537 (1993).

1994]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
IV.

549

CASE LAw DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Appeals
Several cases issued by the court of appeals during the survey period
reemphasized the strict nature of statutory deadlines in superior court
appeals. Other decisions considered a party's standing to appeal and the
applicability of civil sanctions under O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14 in workers'
compensation appeals.
In Borden v. Holland,"' the employee filed a notice of appeal to the
superior court, and subsequently scheduled a hearing. Both parties later
agreed to waive oral argument and to simply submit the case on
briefs."' The superior court issued its order reversing the denial of
benefits by the Full Board which denied the claim based upon a statute
of limitations defense." 2
The employer appealed, arguing that since the superior court's
decision was issued sixty-four days after the filing of the notice of
appeal, the Board's denial of the claim had been affirmed by operation
of law four
days earlier, under the requirements of O.C.G.A section 34-93
105(d).1

In response to the employer's argument, the employee contended that
since oral argument was waived, the superior court had an additional
twenty days under the statute before the Board's decision was considered
affirmed by operation of law. 114 The court of appeals rejected the
employee's arguments, and once again strictly interpreted the provisions
of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105(b) in order to expedite the disposition of
workers' compensation claims." 5 As the court stated: "We decline to
carve out an exception which gives the superior court more than the
statutory sixty days to rule on a claim when the parties waive the

110. 212 Ga. App. 820, 442 S.E.2d 916 (1994).
111. Id. at 821, 442 S.E.2d at 917.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 821-22, 442 S.E.2d at 917 (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) (1994)) requires that
workers' compensation cases appealed to the superior court must have a hearing within
sixty days from the date the notice of appeal is filed with the Board, or the decision is
considered affirmed by operation of law. The statute also provides that if the hearing is
scheduled within the original sixty day period, it may be continued to a date certain by
order of the court, and a written decision must then issue within twenty days of the
hearing date or the Board's decision is affirmed by operation of law. Id. at 820, 442 S.E.2d
at 916.
114. ,Id, at 822, 442 S.E.2d at 917.
115. Id.
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hearing.""' The court of appeals concluded, therefore, that the State
Board's decision was affirmed by operation of law, and the superior
court's order was therefore null. 7
The court applied the same rationale to reach an even harsher result
in Buschel v. Kysori Warren."' In this case, the superior court entered
an order reversing a decision of the State Board on August 5, 1993,
twenty days after the timely scheduled hearing on the appeal was
conducted." 9 The order itself, however, was not entered in the
superior court clerk's office until the next day, twenty-one days after the
hearing.' ° Once again, the court narrowly construed O.C.G.A. section
34-9-105(b), which requires that the order disposing of a workers'
compensation appeal must be entered within twenty days of the hearing
of the appeal or the award is affirmed by operation of law. 2 ' In this
case, therefore, even though the superior court judge actually signed the
order reversing the State Board's decision within twenty days, the order
was null because it was not timely entered in the superior court clerk's
office.'
The court's strict interpretation of the requirements for
superior court appeals serves as a reminder to practitioners that the
deadlines within O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105(b) must be strictly adhered

to.
Southwire u. Hull," is authority for the basic proposition that a
party without standing cannot appeal a decision of the State Board to a
The employer, Southwire Company, requested a
superior court.'
hearing in an attempt to change an element of the employee's medical
care from twenty-four hour nursing attention to substantially less
expensive non-professional attendant care. 1" While the AIJ granted
the employer's request, the Full Board reversed, finding that it would
not be in Hull's best interests for a change in nursing service at that
time."2 Although securing a reversal by the Full Board, the employee
appealed to the superior court, where he obtained an order reversing the
Full Board's decision "to the extent it requires either the dispensing or

116.

Id.

117. Id.
118. 213 Ga. App. 91, 444 S.E.2d 105 (1994).

119.
120.
121.
122.

Id at 93, 444 S.E.2d at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id.

123. 212 Ga. App. 131, 441 S.E.2d 293 (1994).

124. Id. at 131, 441 S.E.2d at 293.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 132, 441 S.E.2d at 294.
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administering of medication by unlicensed attendants." 27 The court
of appeals pointed out that the Full Board's denial of Southwire's request
was a decision in Hull's favor, and he therefore had no standing to
appeal to the superior court."'
In Atlanta Family Restaurants v. Perry,'" the court of appeals reestablished an old, but important, principle regarding Full Board
appeals. 30 The court held that since an appeal to the Full Board is a
de novo proceeding, in which either party can raise any issue involved
in the case, an adverse party need not cross-appeal to preserve the right
to appeal beyond the Full Board decision. 1 The Full Board could not,
therefore, dismiss the employee's Full Board appeal from the ALJ
decision without the employer's consent.'3 2 Practitioners should be
aware, however, that the standard for review at the Full Board level has
been changed by a 1994 amendment to O.C.G.A. section 3 4 -9- 1 0 3 '33
and the different standard of review may well produce a different result
in a subsequent opinion.
Perhaps the most significant case affecting superior court appeals in
workers' compensation cases during the survey period was Contract
Harvesters v. Clark,"M which held that the provisions of O.C.G.A.
section 9-15-14 for frivolous litigation applies to such appeals.'35 The
employer, which appealed an award of benefits from the State Board to
the superior court, was assessed $1500 in attorney fees under O.C.G.A.
Rejectsection 9-15-14 for what was found to be a frivolous appeal.'
ing the employer's argument, the court of appeals held that the
provisions of O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14 applied to workers' compensation
appeals in superior court because such a proceeding constitutes a civil
action within the intended scope of the statute: "We hold that O.C.G.A.
§ 9-15-14(b) authorizes a superior court to assess attorney fees against
a party or his counsel who has prosecuted a frivolous appeal from a
workers' compensation award of the AUJ or the Full Board in the
superior court."1 37 Aggrieved parties in superior court appeals,
therefore, are no longer without a remedy. Although the court has

127. Id.

128. Id.
129. 209 Ga. App. 581, 434 S.E.2d 140 (1993).
130. Id. at 581, 434 S.E.2d at 140.
131. Id. at 582, 434 S.E.2d at 141.

132. Id.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See supra text accompanying note 28.
211 Ga. App. 297, 439 S.E.2d 30 (1993).
Id. at 299, 439 S.E.2d at 33.
Id. at 298, 439 S.E.2d at 31.
Id. at 299, 439 S.E.2d at 33.
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previously held that penalties prescribed by O.C.G.A. section 5-3-31 do
not apply to superior court appeals in workers' compensation cases,'
the more expansive provisions of this Code section now provide a remedy
for frivolous appeals.
B. Arising Out Of And In The Course Of Employment
Two cases during the survey period presented the court of appeals
with the opportunity to further define the elusive parameters of when
an injury "arises out of and in the course of" employment.' 9
The case of Johnson Controls, Inc. v. McNeil, 40 revisited the question of when injuries sustained by an employee who is en route to
medical treatment for a compensable injury "arise out of and in the
course of"employment.'" McNeil was injured while traveling from his
home to a physical therapy appointment prescribed by his orthopedic
physician for a compensable on-the-job injury.142 The court of appeals
held that the injuries McNeil sustained on the way to the physical
therapy appointment were not compensable because the employer did
not require McNeil to attend the physical therapy appointment as a
prerequisite to returning to work, nor did the employer either schedule
the appointment or provide McNeil with transportation for it." The
court emphasized its holding in prior cases that when the accident in
question occurs during a time when the employee is free to go where he
or she chooses, and the medical treatment involved is purely voluntary
and not required in some fashion by the employer, then the claim is not
compensable.'
The case of City of Atlanta v. Spearman,'45 presents a continuation
of the line of cases dealing with injuries occurring in the employer's
parking lot.'
Spearman worked for the City of Atlanta at city hall,
and was provided parking in a garage controlled by the Georgia Building

138. See Butler House Maintenance Co. v. Greeson, 174 Ga. App. 637, 331 S.E.2d 46
(1985).
139. See O.C.GA. § 34-9-1(4) (Supp. 1994).
140. 211 Ga. App. 783, 440 S.E.2d 528 (1994).
141. Id. at 785, 440 S.E.2d at 529-30.
142. Id. at 784, 440 S.E.2d at 529.
143. Id. at 785, 440 S.E.2d at 530.
144. Id. at 783-84, 440 S.E.2d at 529. See Combined Ins. v. Peoples, 207 Ga. App. 560,
428 S.E.2d 391 (1993); Street v. Douglas County Rd. Dep't, 160 Ga. App. 559, 287 S.E.2d
586 (1981).
145. 207 Ga. App. 644, 434 S.E.2d 87 (1993).
146. See generally Peoples v. Emory Univ., 206 Ga. App. 213, 424 S.E.2d 874 (1992);
Tate v. Bruno's, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 395, 408 S.E.2d 456 (1991).

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

1994]

553

Authority about one block away.1 47 Although the City deducted twenty
dollars a month from his pay for the parking space, and then made a
lump sum payment to the Building Authority for the spaces, the garage
itself was managed, operated, and controlled by the Building Authority,
and not the City."4 The ALJ, Full Board, and superior court all held
that Spearman's accident in the garage arose out of and in the course of
her employment on the basis that the City of Atlanta maintained
direction and control over the employee's use of the parking facility, even
though the City had no control over the management of the garage
itself.49 The court of appeals reversed, noting initially the general
rule that injuries occurring while the employee is going to or coming
from work do not arise out of and in the course of employment. 50 An
exception to this rule is that when an employee is injured in a parking
lot owned or maintained by the employer, the incident is held to arise
out of and in the course of employment.'' The court of appeals noted
that "the ALU mistakenly equated the City's control over the allocation
of the parking spaces with control and direction over the parking lot
itself... there was no evidence that the City owned, operated or

controlled the lot."' 52 The fact that the City provided the parking
garage spaces for its employees, therefore, did not bring an injury in the
garage within the scope of the claimant's employment.5 The exception to the "going to/coming from" rule only applies where the employer
owns, operates, or controls the parking facility itself.
C. Attorney's Fees
City of Atlanta v. Spearman,'" also provides an instructive holding
in the area of attorney fees. O.C.G.A. section 34-9-108 provides that
attorney fees can be assessed against any party to a workers' compensation claim when the offending party prosecutes or defends the claim
The ALJ, after finding that the
upon unreasonable grounds.'
claimant's injuries sustained in a parking garage arose out of and in the

147.
148.
149.
150.

209 Ga. App. at 644, 434 8.E.2d at 87.
Id.
Id., 434 S.E.2d at 87-88.
Id. at 645, 434 S.E.2d at 88. See also Tate v. Bruno's, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 395, 408

S.E.2d 456 :1991).
151. 209 Ga. App. at 645, 434 S.E.2d at 88; see also Tate v. Bruno's, Inc., 200 Ga. App.
395, 408 S.E.2d 456 (1991).
152. 209 Ga. App. at 645, 434 S.E.2d at 88 (emphasis in original).

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 209 Ga. App. 644, 434 S.E.2d 87 (1993).

156. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108 (1992).
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course of her employment, assessed attorney fees against the City of
Atlanta based upon the finding that the City's notice defense was
unreasonable. 7 The City was successful before the court of appeals
in reversing the award of benefits, and then argued that its success on
the compensability issue precluded an award of attorney fees on the
notice defense." The court of appeals noted that it was unaware of any
cases in which the employer's defense prevailed and yet the employee
was awarded attorney fees, but noted that "it is conceivable that this
result could lie under the statute."159 The court of appeals nevertheless noted that the City, having prevailed in its ultimate defense of the
claim, obviously did not defend the case upon unreasonable grounds."
The court dismissed the notice defense as "not vigorously pursued."' 1
And "in light of these circumstances we find that the award of attorney
fees was improper."'62
The court seems to acknowledge that while attorney fees can be
assessed where even a part of the claim is defended upon unreasonable
grounds, the totality of the circumstances should be viewed to determine
whether or not the offending party has truly been unreasonable, 3
D.

Board Authority
It is well-established that the State Board of Workers' Compensation
is a creature of statute and has no inherent powers except as directed by
statute.'" Three cases decided during the survey period further
delineate the extent of the Board's authority.
Two cases concern O.C.G.A. section 34-9-47, which controls the Board's
power to appoint interim members to hear the Full Board appeals, and
which has undergone substantial recent amendment.'6 The case of
Arrow Co. v. HalI' was tried before an AUJ who, by the time the case
was ultimately remanded by a superior court to the Full Board for
reconsideration, had herself been appointed a member of the Full
Board.'67 The AIU participated in the decision of the Full Board on

157.

209 Ga. App. at 644, 434 S.E.2d at 88.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id at 646, 434 S.E.2d at 89.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id

164. See Holt Serv. Co. v. Modlin, 163 Ga. App. 283, 293 S.E.2d 741 (1982); Hyck v.
Atlantic Steel Co., 112 Ga. App. 136, 144 S.E.2d 232 (1965).
165. O.C.G-A. § 34-9-47 (Supp. 1994).

166. 212 Ga. App. 365, 441 S.E.2d 794 (1994).
167. Id. at 365, 441 S.E.2d at 795.
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remand.'
Although O.C.G.A. section 34-9-47(b) was amended in 1993
to preclude such a situation from happening, the amendment occurred
after the time relevant to the case before the court.169 The court of
appeals nevertheless found that O.C.G.A. section 15-1-8(a)(2) controlled. 7 ' This statute provides that:
no judge or justice of any court, magistrate, nor presiding officer of any
inferior judicature or commission shall: ... (3) sit in any case or
proceeding... in which he has presided in any inferior judicature,
when his ruling or decision is17the subject of review, without the
consent of all parties in interest. 1
Finding that none of the parties to the workers' compensation claim
received any notice that the AU who heard the case would participate
in the Full Board decision, the court17held that the Full Board's decision
was improper and required remand. 1
The case of Levi Straus & Co. v. Lane17' also involved O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-47, and the Board's attempt to implement by its rule-making authority what had been omitted in an amendment to the Code
section. 74 The Code was amended in 1992 to create separate trial and
appellate divisions within the State Board of Workers' Compensation.7 5 This amendment, however, deleted the Board's authority to
make temporary appointments of administrative law judges to the
appellate division.'76 Acting to correct this oversight, the Board,
pursuant to its rule-making powers under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-59,
adopted Board Rule 47, which read as follows:
The appellate division of the Board may appoint administrative law
judges of the trial division to serve as a judge of the appellate division
to review cases on appeal; however, not more than one administrative
law judge
shall serve as a judge on the appellate division on any one
177
case.

When Levi Straus appealed an award of benefits to claimant Lane to the
Full Board, one of the members of the Full Board that heard the appeal

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 366, 441 S.E.2d at 795.
Id., 441 S.E.2d at 796.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 15-1-8(a)(2) (1990).
212 Ga. App. at 366-67, 441 S.E.2d at 796.

173.
174.

__

- Ga. App.
Ga. App. _

-

-__S.E.2d - (A93A2507, 11/15/93).
S.E.2d - (A93A2507, 11/15/93).

175. 1992 GA. LAWS 1942.
176. Id.
177. Board Rule 47 (Supp. 1994).
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The court of appeals

agreed with Levi Straus that the Board was without authority to adopt
Board Rule 47 when the Legislature had specifically deleted the
authority to appoint an administrative law judge as a temporary
member of the Full Board in the 1992 amendment to O.C.G.A. section
34-9-47.179

Since the Legislature acted in 1993 to again amend the

Code section and reconfer upon the Board the authority to appoint acting
members of the Full Board, the case is significant as the most recent
authority for the proposition that the State Board is limited expressly to
the powers granted by the Legislature, and cannot utilize its rulemaking authority to exceed those limitations."s
E. Change in Physicians
In Dart Container Corp. v. Jones,"'1 the court of appeals ruled that
its decision in Lee Fabricatorsv. Cook,'8 2 should be given retroactive
application."'
The court's decision in Lee Fabricators was that
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200(b) and O.C.G.A. section 34-9-201 provide the
exclusive method for changing authorized physicians, and that parties
disregarding these procedures are "bound by the consequences of their
actions. " s4
' Although this decision reversed years of standard practice
within the workers' compensation field, in which changes of physician
were routinely agreed to voluntarily without a formal award of the
Board, the court found that the decision in Lee Fabricatorsdid not
establish a new substantive principle of law, nor overrule past precedent."s Although the decision in Lee Fabricators was legislatively
overruled by an amendment to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-201 that became
effective July 1, 1994,'I it is now clear that the decision in- Lee
Fabricatorswill control all cases prior to the 1994 amendment.
F

Change in Condition
The court of appeals resolved an issue that has been hotly disputed
over the last several years by deciding in Gordon County Farm v.
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331, 433 S.E.2d 417 (1993).
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Maloney8 7 that an employee's testimony regarding what she was told
by a prospective employer about why she was not hired is inadmissible
hearsay, and cannot be utilized to meet her burden of proof to show a
change in condition." s
Maloney returned to work after sustaining a compensable injury at
Gordon County Farm, and was later terminated for causes unrelated to
her injury. At the hearing she requested to prove a change in condition,
Maloney relied on her own testimony that a prospective employer told
her that she could not be hired because she was on workers' compensation.l" 9 The court held that the employee's testimony regarding the
statements of the prospective employer was inadmissible hearsay, and
not admissible under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.90
A majority of the court of appeals agreed that the statements of the
prospective employer were inadmissible hearsay. 9 ' The dissenting
opinion, however, argued that the employee's own testimony regarding
the fact that the job offer was withdrawn only after she mentioned her
compensable injury was both admissible and probative of her inability
to find suitable employment.'9 2 The majority felt that even this
testimony was inadmissible hearsay because it was offered not merely
as evidence of the timing of the withdrawn job offer, but as evidence of
the truth of the alleged statements by the prospective employer. 98
Apparently, no evidence was introduced into the record to substantiate
the allegation that the prospective employer actually offered the job and
then withdrew it other than the employee's own testimony.' " The
court of appeals therefore determined that there was no admissible
testimony in the record to support the employee's burden of proof, and
reversed the award of benefits.'9 5

187. 214 Ga. App. 253, 447 S.E.2d 623 (1994).
188. Id. at 254, 447 S.E.2d at 624.
189. Id. at 253-54, 447 S.E.2d at 624.
190. Id. at 254, 447 S.E.2d at 624 (citing O.C.GA. § 24-3-3 (Supp. 1994)).

191. Id.
192. 214 Ga. App. at 255-56, 447 S.E.2d at 625-26 (Pope, J., dissenting). The claimant's
burden of proof in a change in condition case is to show that his inability to find
employment is proximately caused by the original compensable injury. Brown v. Georgia
Power Co., 181 Ga. App. 500, 352 S.E.2d 818 (1987); Eveo Plastics v. Burton, 200 Ga. App.
121, 407 S.E.2d 60 (1991). To meet this burden, the claimant may not simply present
evidence that he has looked for work; rather, the claimant must show that the reason the
claimant has been refused job offers is because of restrictions from the original
compensable injury.
193. 214 Ga. App. at 254-55, 447 S.E.2d at 624-25.
194. Id., 447 S.E.2d at 625.
195. Id. at 255, 447 S.E.2d at 625.
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The court's adherence to its earlier pronouncements regarding the
employee's burden of proof in change in condition cases continued in
Autolite v. Glaze,' and Atlanta Hilton & Towers v. Gaither.'" The
decision in Glaze reaffirmed the court's commitment to the principle that
an employee cannot meet the burden of proof to show a change in
condition merely by testifying that she has sought work from other
employers but was not hired.'
Without evidence as to why she was
not hired, Glaze did not meet her burden of proof to show that her
compensable injury was the proximate cause of her unemployment.' 9'
The employee met an even worse fate in the Gaitherdecision. Gaither
alleged a change in condition from a fourth slip and fall accident while
employed at the Atlanta Hilton Hotel.2 In addition to holding that
numerous inconsistencies in Gaither's testimony supported the ALJ
decision that no change in condition had in fact occurred, the court noted
that Gaither had not presented any evidence that she had even sought
work after her termination by the hotel, and therefore could not meet
her burden of proof to show a change in condition.9" In addition to
losing the appeal, Gaither was assessed $500 in penalties for a frivolous
appeal in arguing that she was entitled to an assessment of attorney
fees against the employer. '2
The distinction between the substantive and procedural requirements
in a change in condition case is highlighted in Freeman v. Continental
Baking Co.9'
Freeman sustained a compensable injury, and was
released to light-duty work by his authorized treating physician. ' 4
Freeman then bid on a position in the shipping department with the
employer and, according to the evidence, would have been offered the
position because of his seniority but for the fact that he failed a routine
drug test. ' 6 Freeman was terminated because of his drug use, and the
employer unilaterally suspended benefits four months later.' ' The
ALJ, and the Full Board, ordered the reinstatement of benefits on the
grounds that the employee was never formally offered suitable employment before his termination, and therefore the employer had not met its
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211 Ga. App. 780, 440 S.E.2d 497 (1994).
210 Ga. App. 343, 436 S.E.2d 71 (1993).
211 Ga. App. at 781, 440 S.E.2d at 498.
Id. at 780, 440 S.E.2d at 497.
210 Ga. App. at 343, 436 S.E.2d at 73.
Id. at 346, 436 S.E.2d at 74.
Id. at 348, 436 S.E.2d at 76.
212 Ga. App. 855, 443 S.E.2d 520 (1994).
Id. at 855, 443 S.E.2d at 521.
Id. at 855-56, 443 S.E.2d at 521.
Id. at 856, 443 S.E.2d at 521.
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burden to prove a change in condition for the better."7 The court of
appeals, however, affirmed the superior court's reversal of the award of
benefits.' 8
As the court pointed out, it is well-settled that to justify a suspension
of benefits, an employer must show that the employee has undergone a
"change in condition" for the better.2" To meet this burden, the
employer must show either that the employee is able to return to work
or that suitable work is available. 2" These are the well-established
requirements to prove a substantive change in condition. Board Rule
221(i) and Board Rule 240 constitute the procedural requirements for
suspending benefits based upon a change in condition.2 1" Board Rule
221(i) does not specifically contemplate a unilateral suspension of
benefits when the claimant is still restricted to light-duty work,212 but
Board Rule 240 provides that an employer may not unilaterally suspend
benefits based upon the allegation that the employee has unreasonably
refused21suitable
employment without obtaining an order from the State
3
Board.
Continental Baking argued that Freeman underwent a change in
condition for the better because he would have returned to suitable
court of appeals
employment but for his improper drug use. 214 The cuto
agreed that the proper focus was on Freeman's economic condition, and
not whether he had formally been offered a job.21' Even though no job
was actually offered, because of Freeman's improper drug use, the court
held that the employer had met its burden of proof to show that
Freeman's unemployment was caused
by his impermissible drug use,
216
rather than his compensable injury
The decision in Freeman is interesting in its focus on the proximate
cause of the claimant's unemployment, a theme that has been sounded
regularly in change in condition cases involving the claimant's burden
of proof.217

Clearly, there was work available to Freeman that was

suitable to his impaired condition, and the fact that it was not formally

207.

Id.

208.

Id. at 857, 443 S.E.2d at 522.

209.
210.
S.E.2d
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id at 856, 443 S.E.2d at 521.
See Sadie G. Mays Memorial Nursing Home v. Freeman, 163 Ga. App. 557, 295
340 (1982); Peterson/Puritan v.Day, 157 Ga. App. 827, 278 S.E.2d 674 (1981).
Board Rule 221(i); Board Rule 240 (Supp. 1994).
Board Rule 240.
Board Rule 240.
212 Ga. App. at 855-56, 443 S.E.2d at 521.
Id at 856, 443 S.E.2d at 521.
Id. at 856-57, 443 S.E.2d at 522.
See supra text accompanying note 207.
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offered to him was caused by his own improper drug use. Although the
court may well have inserted itself as a fact-finder in concluding that
Freeman's drug use was the cause of his unemployment, it properly
placed the emphasis upon substance over form. It will be interesting to
see whether or not future decisions regarding the employer's burden of
proof in change in condition cases continue the focus on the proximate
cause of the claimant's disability, as have the cases interpreting the
claimant's burden of proof.
Change in Condition versus New Accident
The court of appeals revisited the issue of "change in condition versus
new accident" in the case of City of Marietta v. Kirby.21 The case law
in this area has been confusing for several years now.21 Unfortunately, the decision in Kirby does not shed any new light on the problem.
Kirby injured his neck in 1982 while working for the City of Marietta,
In 1989, Kirby
and was awarded workers' compensation benefits.'
filed another claim for disability benefits, and the insurer for the 1982
claim contended that Kirby's disability was the result of a new injury
occurring in 1986 when he lifted a dog while fighting a fire. 1 The
insurer, which did not provide coverage for the City at the time of the
alleged new accident, pointed to medical records and the deposition of
the claimant's physician, both of which indicated that the claimant had
reported aggravating his condition by lifting the dog.' The ALJ, Full
Board, and superior court, however, all concluded that the evidence
supported the determination that the claimant had suffered a change in
condition, rather than a new accident.'
It is well-established that a change in condition occurs when a
claimant is injured on the job, receives compensation, returns to work,
and then "as a result of the wear and tear of ordinary life and the
activity connected with performing his normal duties and not because of
a specific job related incident, his condition gradually worsens to the
point that he can no longer continue to perform his ordinary work." 4
Both Kirby and his physician explained the reference in the medical
records to the job-related aggravation as merely a response to questionG.

218. 210 Ga. App. 566, 436 S.E.2d 762 (1993).
219. See Bagley & Kniffen, Change in Condition Versus New Accident: Old Problems
Revisited, 40 MERCER L. REv. 961 (1989).
220. 210 Ga. App. at 566, 436 S.E.2d at 762.

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224.

Central State Hosp. v. James, 147 Ga. App. 308, 310, 248 S.E.2d 678, 679 (1978).
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ing by the physician about the employee's recent activities, and not
because the incident made his condition worse.' Despite the specific
mention of a job-related aggravation, therefore, the court of appeals held
that there was sufficient evidence for the State Board to conclude that
the claimant's disability was the result of a gradual worsening, rather
than a new accident. 26 In so holding, the court appeared to follow the
causation analysis emphasized in its most recent cases 7 rather than
the bright-line
test enunciated by the decision in James228 and its
29
progeny.2

H.

Coverage
Occasionally, the court of appeals is presented with insurance coverage
questions in the workers' compensation context. The case of American
Resources Insurance Co. v. Connor"' offered some unusual facts on
this issue.
American Resources Insurance Company provided workers' compensation insurance to Vector Construction, Inc., a general construction
contractor, and Omega Interiors, a wallboard installation subcontractor."' Omega and Vector were sister corporations, sharing common
ownership and office space. After Omega experienced an adverse loss
ratio, however, American cancelled its policy under the terms of the
agreement. Omega made several efforts to renew its policy with
American, and even threatened to cancel Vector's insurance with
American if the policy for Omega was not reinstated. American's
consistent response, however, was that it was not interested in insuring
Omega under any circumstances, and that if necessary it would cancel
the Vector policy as well rather than insure Omega. 2
The agent attempting to place coverage for Omega suggested that
Omega lease its employees to Vector through an employee leasing
agreement and then add the Omega employees under a special
endorsement to Vector's policy with American. After the agreement was
drafted, the agent requested that American issue endorsements to
Vector's policy providing coverage for additional job classifications listed

225. 210 Ga. App. at 568-69, 436 S.E.2d at 765.
226. Id. at 569, 436 S.E.2d at 765.
227. 209 Ga. App. 885, 887, 434 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1993).
228. 147 Ga. App. 308, 309, 248 S.E.2d 678 (1978).
229. See Certain v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 153 Ga. App. 571, 266
S.E.2d 263 (1980); Beers Constr. Co. v. Stephens, 162 Ga. App. 87, 290 S.E.2d 181 (1982).
230. 209 Ga. App. 885, 434 S.E.2d 737 (1993).
231. Id. at 885, 434 S.E.2d at 738.
232. Id. at 886, 434 S.E.2d at 738-39.
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as "wallboard-install and drivers" and "clerical" workers, the same
classifications as covered in Omega's cancelled policy.'
American
issued the requested endorsements, but later denied a claim filed by an
Omega employee, contending that the placing of Omega employees under
Vector's policy through the endorsement was fraudulent.'
Although the AUJ agreed that the leasing agreement and subsequent
endorsements were "a subterfuge, if not an outright fraud," the judge
found coverage existed because American was given sufficient information when the endorsements were requested to investigate further.2'
The AIJ found coverage, therefore, simply based upon American's
obligation to investigate the request for the endorsement to Vector's
policy. The Full Board and superior court affirmed, but the court of
appeals reversed.'
The court of appeals found that the State Board's decision regarding
coverage was essentially an estoppel theory, holding that American
should have known that the endorsements to the Vector policy were
intended to cover Omega employees. 7 The court noted initially that
the doctrine of estoppel cannot be used to expand an insurance policy as
to such basic elements as who is insured' but also noted that the
evidence did not support the Board's conclusion that American had
sufficient information to lead it to believe that the endorsements were
covering Omega employees. 9
The court pointed to American's
consistent refusal to insure Omega employees, even at the cost of losing
the Vector policy, and to what the ALJ described as the employer's
"subterfuge, if not outright fraud" in attempting to cover Omega
employees by adding them to the Vector policy." Given this finding,
the court found there was no evidence to support the conclusion that,
even if an estoppel argument applied, American knew or should have
known that Omega employees were to be covered under the Vector
endorsements.?4 '

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
(1988),
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id., 434 S.E.2d at 739.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 887, 434 S.E.2d at 740.
Id. See Sandner, Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 189 Ga. App. 277, 375 S.E.2d 611
modified on other grounds, 259 Ga. 317, 380 S.E.2d 704 (1989).
209 Ga. App. at 888, 434 S.E.2d at 740.
Id.
Id.
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I. Death Claims
The case of Buschel v. Kysor/Warren2 " presented the court of
appeals with its latest opportunity to visit the presumption that an
employee's death arises out of and in the course of employment if he is
found dead or dying at a place he might reasonably be expected to be in
the performance of his job, and the death is unexplained. 2'
On November 10, 1990, Buschel walked to the breakroom at Kysor/Warren, bought a soft drink, and collapsed, gasping for air. Although
rushed to a hospital by ambulance, Buschel died in the emergency room.
Her dependents brought a claim for workers' compensation death
benefits alleging that Buschel's death was caused by exposure to the
substance Toluene at work. Although four different pathologists gave
opinions on the cause of Buschel's death, none of them could agree on
the cause. The AU found that the decedent's death was unexplained,
and that the presumption in favor of compensability applied. 2 " In
rejecting the employer's defense that the death occurred during a
regularly scheduled work break,2" the ALJ also concluded that
Buschel's death resulted from long-term exposure to Toluene in the work
place.

2"

At the court of appeals, the employer contended that the award of
death benefits should be reversed because of the inconsistent conclusions
that the death was unexplained and that it was caused by long-term
exposure to Toluene.' 7 The court of appeals rejected this argument,
finding that the conflict was of no legal significance because it was made
Moreover, the
in response to the employer's rest break defense. 2'
court pointed out that the location of the decedent in the breakroom was
not significant to the application of the presumption, since this was a
place where the employee might reasonably be expected to be in the
performance of her duties. 9 The court agreed with the State Board
that the employer had not demonstrated that the injury leading up to
the employee's death (exposure to Toluene) occurred during the regularly

242. 213 Ga. App. 91, 444 S.E.2d 105 (1994).
243. Zamora v. Coffee Gen. Hosp., 162 Ga. App. 82, 290 S.E.2d 192 (1982); Odom v.
TransAmerica Ins., 148 Ga. App. 156, 251 S.E.2d 48 (1978).
244. 213 Ga. App. at 92,444 8.E.2d at 107.
245. Id. at 94, 444 S.E.2d at 108. See Miles v. Brown Transport Corp., 163 Ga. App.
563, 294 S.E.2d 734 (1982); Rampley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 612, 234 S.E.2d
183 (1977).
246. 213 Ga. App. at 92, 444 S.E.2d at 107.
247. Id. at 93, 444 S.E.2d at 107-108.
248. Id. at 93-94, 444 S.E.2d at 108.
249. Id. at 94, 444 S.E.2d at 108.
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scheduled lunch break." ° Therefore, the employer had not established
an essential element of the lunch break defense so as to rebut the
" '
presumption of compensability.25
In Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Bottle Warehouse,252 the
court of appeals held that the limitation in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-265(b)
regarding payment of death benefits to non-resident alien dependents
only applies where there is proof that the dependents are actually nonresidents.'
While it was undisputed that the decedent was an
Ethiopian national who sent money to his parents in that country, and
no dependents of the deceased employee were found in the United
States, no actual proof that the decedent's dependents were nonresidents was presented.'
The employer argued that, direct proof of
the dependents' non-residence notwithstanding, the $10,000 sum
ordinarily paid to the Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund (SITF)
where a compensable death occurs without any remaining dependents
should be reduced to the one $1,000 maximum mandated by O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-265(b) to non-resident dependents."5 Although the State
Board and superior court agreed with this argument, the court of
appeals rejected it holding "to the extent that O.C.G.A. Section 34-9358(a) requires computations to be made based on a hypothetical'
dependent, we fail to understand why it should be presumed that such
In the absence
dependents of alien workers are non-resident aliens.'
therefore, the
of direct proof that the dependents are non-resident aliens,
25 7
provisions of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-265(b) do not apply.
J.

Employment Relationship
Among the more significant workers' compensation decisions during
the survey period is North v. Floyd County Board of Education.'
This case, decided by a five to four majority of the court of appeals,
potentially redefines when an individual becomes an employee subject
to the coverage of the Workers' Compensation Act. 9
North applied for a position as a substitute bus driver with the Floyd
County Board of Education and began a two and a half week training
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259,

Id.
Id.
209 Ga. App. 244, 433 S.E.2d 84 (1993).
Id. at 245, 433 S.E.2d at 85.
Id.
Id. at 244, 433 S.E.2d at 85.
Id. at 245, 433 S.E.2d at 85.
Id.
212 Ga. App. 593, 442 S.E.2d 809 (1994).
Id, at 593, 442 S.E.2d at 809.
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period which included both classroom and on-the-road assignments.
North was neither paid during the training period nor assured she would
ever be hired by the Board of Education. After riding with a driver on
a route during the training period, North got off the bus, and on the way
to her car slipped, fell on an embankment, and injured her ankle.2'
When she filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, the Board of
Education defended on the grounds that North was not an employee
covered under workers' compensation.2 6' The State Board denied the
claim for benefits, finding that North failed to meet her burden to show
that she was an employee of the Board of Education at the time of the
injury2 2 A five-judge majority of the court of appeals affirmed, but
upon reasoning that is arguably different from prior decisions on this
issue. 20
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-1(2) defines "employee" as: "Every person in the
service of another under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written
or implied ....

The court of appeals has previously held that the

chief test in determining whether or not an employer-employee
relationship exists, for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act, is
whether or not the alleged employer had a right of control over the
alleged employee. 5 It is the mere right of control that indicates the
existence of an actual employee relationship, regardless of whether or
not the control was ever actually exercised. 2 6 The court has also held
that actual payment of wages is not necessary to form an employment
relationship, nor does payment need to be monetary.267 In Tommy
Nobis Center, Inc. v. Barfield,' the court held that a non-profit
corporation that trained handicapped persons participating in a job
training partnership act was responsible for providing workers'
compensation to the participants of the program. 26 9
In reviewing these cases, the majority in North disagreed that the
unifying principle of the cases construing when an employment
relationship begins for workers' compensation purposes is the employer's
right of control.270 Instead, it focused on the benefit to the employer

260. Id., 442 S.E.2d at 810.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 595, 442 S.E.2d at 811.
264. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(2) (Supp. 1994).

265. Barbree v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 186, 123 S.E.2d 905 (1962).
266. Golosh v. Cherokee Cab Co., 226 Ga. 636, 176 S.E.2d 925 (1970).
267. Id. at 639, 176 S.E.2d at 927.
268.

187 Ga. App. 394, 370 S.E.2d 517 (1988).

269. Id. at 394, 370 S.E.2d at 517.
270. 212 Ga. App. at 595, 442 S.E.2d at 811.
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from the alleged employee's services: "The potential benefit flowing to
Floyd County from North's training, however, the availability of another
driver in a pool of substitute drivers, is not significant enough to demand
a finding of an implied contract of employment in this case." 27 The
majority went on to find that, with respect to the issue of control, the
State Board as finder of fact was within its authority to rely upon
testimony from the Director of Transportation for the Board of Education
that he did not exercise any control over North's activities, and would
not unless and until she was hired. 2 As the dissent points out,
however, the import of the majority's decision is to favor what might be
termed the "potential benefit" analysis as opposed to the right of control
analysis.27 3 In so doing, the majority may well have opened the door
to competing arguments, many based upon the same precedent, as to
when an employment relationship begins for workers' compensation
purposes.
K

Heart Attacks
In the past, heart attack cases have involved one of two factual
scenarios. Either the heart attack was brought about by physically
strenuous labor, or it resulted from stress or pressure associated with
the job. 4 In A & P Transportation v. Warren,"'B the court of appeals laid the groundwork for a third scenario, which is lack of exercise
and bad food.27
Warren, a truck driver, felt pain in his chest while on a return trip for
his employer. He thought it might have been his hiatal hernia, and on
the day after concluding his trip he was treated by his personal
physician for this condition. That afternoon he suffered a massive
coronary infarction, which led to the filing of a workers' compensation
claim.277
The evidence revealed that not only was Warren overweight, but he
suffered from hypertension, had been a heavy smoker for forty years and
had a family history of heart problems."T While acknowledging these
risk factors, Warren nevertheless claimed that his heart condition had

271. Id. at 594, 442 S.E.2d at 811.
272. Id. at 595, 442 S.E.2d at 811.
273. 212 Ga. App. at 597, 442 S.E.2d at 813 (Blackburn J., dissenting).
274. See, e4g., Guye v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Ga. 213, 244 S.E.2d 864 (1978); Zippy
Mart, Inc. v. Fender, 170 Ga. App. 617, 317 S.E.2d 575 (1978).
275. 213 Ga. App. 60, 443 S.E.2d 857 (1994).
276. Id. at 60, 443 S.E.2d at 857.
277. Id., 443 S.E.2d at 858.
278. ld.
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been aggravated because of the nature of his employment. Specifically,
he maintained that as an over-the-road truck driver he was forced to eat
greasy and junk food, was denied the ability to exercise, and was
subjected to both physical and mental stress.27 9 Despite the fact that
the Act places a higher burden of proof on heart attacks, the ALJ found
in Warren's favor, holding that he was "'virtually destined' to have a
heart attack because of certain factors, i.e., cigarette smoking, lack of
exercise, and an unhealthy diet of high-cholesterol food, which put him
at great risk."' According to the ALJ, at least two of these factors,
bad food and lack of exercise, were in part attributable to the lifestyle
of a long-haul trucker.281 In a five to four decision, the court of
appeals affirmed, holding that the "nature of the employment may, as
in this case of long-haul truck driving, require long periods of stress
without physical exercise, and without the availability of a healthy diet,
all exacerbated by time constraints." '2 Although noting that Warren
was at risk for a heart attack because of other factors, including his
personal habits, the majority, with two judges concurring specially,
apparently felt obligated to affirm the award of benefits because of the
findings of fact by the AIJ.'
Unfortunately, the majority failed to analyze the facts of the claim
under the heightened burden of proof for heart attacks, which is a
preponderance of competent and credible evidence.'
This was not
lost on four judges, however, and in an opinion authored by Judge
Smith, the dissent stated that "[there is no showing that smoking, diet,
or lack of exercise formed part of the usual duties of Warren's employment, or that his employer controlled his personal habits."' Warren's
decision to smoke, eat bad food and avoid exercise was purely personal.' Indeed, and as pointed out by the dissent, it was "counter to the
express instructions of his employer.' s7 As for the medical evidence,
the treating cardiologist testified that Warren
would have suffered his
2
heart attack whether he worked or not. 88
This decision theoretically places employers at risk for workers'
compensation liability because of the personal habits of their employees.

279.
280.
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282.
283.
284.
285.
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287.
288.

Id.
Id. at 61-62, 443 S.E.2d at 859.
Id. at 62, 443 S.E.2d at 859.
Id. at 64, 443 S.E.2d at 860.
Id., 443 S.E.2d at 861.
O.C.GA § 34-9-1(4) (Supp. 1994).
213 Ga. App. at 66, 443 S.E.2d at 862 (Smith J., dissenting).
Id. at 66, 213 S.E.2d at 862.
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Id. at 68, 443 S.E.2d at 863.
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Although a non-smoking policy may be enforceable, few, if any,
employees are going to be told what to eat and when to exercise. Trying
to ascertain a risk for determination of premiums based on the behavior
of employees would not only be a nightmare for both employers and
insurers, but it may cause some employers to make hiring decisions
2 9
which are illegal. The Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA7) 8
likely would prohibit the consideration of risk factors such as those in
Warren's case as a basis for hiring him as a trucker. The Act does not
operate in a vacuum. By taking into account other policy considerations,
employers and employees would be better served. The award of workers'
compensation benefits to Warren because of his personal habits was
short-sighted.
L.

Judgments

The procedure for attacking an award of the State Board after the
expiration of the time limits for appeal has troubled practitioners on
several occasions during the past several years. The Act provides no
means for doing so. Instead, it merely provides for converting an award
into a judgment at the superior court level which can then be enforced.'
As the defendant discovered in Wade v. Harris," when
the time limit has expired for appealing an award of the State Board, it
can be attacked only if judgment is procured. 2 The proper forum is
the superior court, and the proper manner is by filing a motion to set
29
aside judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9 - 1 1 -60.m
In Wade, several alleged dependents filed a claim for workers'
compensation benefits against George A. Harris, d/b/a George A. Harris
Enterprises. 294 No one from the employer appeared at the hearing
before the State Board, and an award was issued in favor of the
dependents. Months later the dependents petitioned for judgment on the
award at the superior court level.'
Again, the employer failed to
appear, and judgment was entered.'
For reasons unknown, the
dependents thereafter moved for default judgment, and it was only then
that George Harris appeared pro se, contending he was never

289. The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 USC § 12101(a) (1988 & Supp.
1994).

290. O.C.GA. § 34-9-106 (1992).
291. 210 Ga. App. 882, 437 S.E.2d 863 (1994).
292. Id. at 883, 437 S.E.2d at 865.
293. See Griggs v. All-Steel Bldgs., Inc., 201 Ga. App. 111, 410 S.E.2d 309 (1991).
294. 210 Ga. App. at 882, 437 S.E.2d at 864.
295. Id., 437 S.E.2d at 864-65.
296. Id. at 882, 437 S.E.2d at 863.
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served."' Harris thereafter moved to open the default on several
grounds, including that, individually, he was not a proper party.2' 8
The superior court opened the default, and after receiving motions for
summary judgment, granted Harris' request for dismissal individually
on the grounds that the claim was filed against the corporate entity
Judgment was thereafter entered against George A. Harris
only.'
Enterprises, Inc.3 w
The court of appeals reversed, specifically holding that default
procedures were inapplicable.30 ' When a party seeks to convert an
award of the State Board into a judgment the superior court's role is
extremely narrow.' The superior court may refuse to grant judgment
only if the award is legally insufficient on its face.3° In this case the
award was not legally insufficient, and the superior court had no
authority to make factual findings contrary to those made by the
The case was remanded with direction that judgment be
ALJ.'
entered against "George A. Harris, d/b/a George A. Harris Enterprises,
Inc."' 5 If Harris thereafter desired to attack the judgment, he would
be limited to one of three grounds set forth in O.C.G.A. section 9-1160(d).3"6 He would also be entitled to present evidence in support of
his motion to set aside.3 7
M. Medical Treatment
In K-Mart Corp. v. Bright,0 8 the court of appeals was faced with the
question of whether certain medical treatment, which was undoubtedly
unauthorized, qualified as an emergency."°9 The State Board held that
while the employee's psychiatric treatment was rendered by an
unauthorized provider, it in fact came during an emergency, which it
defined as "'an unforeseen occurrence or combination of circumstances
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298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303,
304.
305.
306.
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Id. at 883, 437 S.E.2d at 865.
Id.
Id. at 883-84, 437 S.E.2d at 865.
Id. at 884, 437 S.E.2d at 865.
Id.
Id. at 885, 437 S.E.2d at 866.
Id.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d) (1993).
Wade v. Har-is, 201 Ga. App. 111, 112-13, 410 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1991).
210 Ga. App. 658, 436 S.E.2d 801 (1993).
Id. at 658, 436 S.E.2d at 801.
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which calls for immediate action or remedy; pressing necessity;
exigency"'3 1
Because there was some evidence that an emergency
existed, the Board's award of medical benefits was affirmed.311
As a general rule, the employer or insurer cannot require that an
employee seek treatment from physicians on the posted panel if the
claim is controverted in its entirety. 12 Whether this occurred was at
issue in Nu Skin International,Inc. v. Baxter."
In this case the
employer properly commenced indemnity benefits, but refused to pay
certain medical bills because treatment was obtained from unauthorized
providers.3 14 Except for one emergency room bill, the AIJ and the Full
Board ruled that the employer and insurer were correct in refusing to
pay.315 The superior court reversed on the grounds that refusal to pay
the medicals amounted to a controvert of Baxter's claim.31 6 The court
of appeals disagreed, holding that refusal to pay unauthorized medical
treatment was not tantamount to a controvert of the entire claim.317
In this case the employer specifically stated on the first report of injury
that it was contesting only the unauthorized medical treatment and "did
not otherwise 'controvert' the claim .... 3 18
N.

PermanentPartialDisability

Loss of use of a body part because of a work-related accident entitles
an employee to permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits. 319 Total
loss of vision to one eye computes to benefits of 150 weeks. 3" The case
of Gaddis v. Georgia Mountain Contractors21 reveals how modern
medicine can allow for payment to be made on two occasions for total
loss of vision to the same eye.3 22 Gaddis suffered an initial injury to
his right eye in 1977. Although his vision was almost totally destroyed,
it was significantly improved by a corneal transplant nine years later.
While it is not clear when payment was made, Liberty Mutual paid for

310.

Id. at 659, 436 S.E.2d at 802-03 (citing Armstrong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 135 Ga.

App. 278, 217 S.E.2d 486 (1975)).
311. Id., 436 S.E.2d at 803.
312. ITT-Continental Baking Co. v. Powell, 182 Ga. App. 533, 356 S.E.2d 267 (1987).
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total loss of vision. In 1988 he suffered a second injury to his right eye
In 1990 an ALJ ordered Liberty
which destroyed the transplant.'
Mutual to pay for full loss of vision despite a showing that Gaddis had
already been paid for full loss of vision after the 1977 injury. 24
Apparently, and while the decision is silent on this point, the order most
likely was based on the fact that Gaddis' recovery from the corneal
transplant had been negated by yet another accident. The Full Board
affirmed.3" In 1992 Liberty Mutual filed a motion with the Board
seeking an order that Gaddis repay the PPD benefits which he received
for loss of vision stemming from the 1986 accident.3 26 This time the
Board changed its mind, finding that he was not entitled to the benefits,
and ordered him to repay Liberty Mutual. 327 Although the superior
court affirmed, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the Board had
no authority to modify an award which was two years old.38 As a
result, Gaddis was paid twice for total loss of vision to the same eye.
Although it is difficult to understand how this could have happened, it
undoubtedly goes back to the first accident. Liberty Mutual probably
made payment for full loss of vision before the corneal transplant. While
it could have taken credit for any overpayment of benefits made
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-243, the fact that Gaddis suffered a
second accident which was distinct and apart from the first one
precluded this possibility.
Rycroft Defense
Fort Howard Corp. v. Devoe"2 9 was by far the most interesting
decision in the application misrepresentations area during the current
survey period. Not only does the decision present some interesting facts,
but it provides some insight as to how the ADA requirements impact
this defense.
Devoe applied for a position with Fort Howard Corporation and,
during a multi-step hiring process, certified that he had never suffered
from any back or spinal problems." ° Fort Howard, which had only
heavy labor positions available for entry level employees, proved that it
carefully screened applicants, even going so far as to show them the type
0.
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of work required. During the application process, Devoe failed to
disclose prior back problems stemming from a prior work-related
accident and which resulted in substantial lost time. After suffering a
back injury at Fort Howard, his claim was controverted on the grounds
of application misrepresentation. Although a representative of Fort
Howard testified that Devoe probably would not have been hired if its
investigation had confirmed a history of back problems, she went on to
admit that she did not "rely on the medical questionnaire for the 'actual
hiring decision."' 1 Based on this statement, Devoe argued that the
reliance factor was missing.3 2 The court of appeals agreed with the
State Board, and held that his misrepresentation was a substantial
factor in the decision by Fort Howard to "place [him] at the only work
available, work which resulted in his injury."'
This decision is
absolutely consistent with the ADA, which prohibits certain preemployment inquiries about a prospective employee's physical condition.'
When Devoe was offered a job which he knew required heavy
labor, he was under a duty to disclose his back condition because it put
him at risk for an injury 3 Public policy favors truthfulness in the
employment application process. 33
The other two decisions concerning application misrepresentation
involved the third prong, which is a causal connection between the false
representation and the injury.3 37 In Gordon County Farm v. Cope,"8
the court of appeals upheld a denial of benefits by the State Board.' 9
The employee argued that an application misrepresentation should not
apply since her pre-existing condition did not actually cause her fall."
The Board and the court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that
the defense applied because the injury was more severe than it would
have been had she not suffered from a pre-existing condition. 1 The
court reached the opposite result in CapitalAtlanta, Inc. v. Carroll.'42
While the employee may have misrepresented a prior condition, which
was noted to be a knee injury some fifteen years earlier, the treating
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physician testified this prior condition had completely healed, involved
a different part of the knee, had no significant relationship to the
current accident, and made it no more significant than it otherwise
would have been.'
Even if the employer shows that it would never
have hired the employee had it known about the prior injury, it must
still satisfy the third prong, which is a causal connection between the
misrepresentation and the injury for which benefits' are claimed. 3 "
P

Subsequent Injury Trust Fund
In Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Hanson Industries,3" the
employee suffered from circulatory problems throughout most of her
employment with Hanson Industries. She missed work intermittently
because of the standing requirements associated with her position, and
was paid workers' compensation benefits. In June of 1989, although the
employee had been transferred to a lighter duty position in the plant,
she contracted a bacterial infection which was "facilitated and exacerbated by her poor circulation. 3 " The employer readily agreed that the
job aggravated the employee's condition, and began to pay her total
disability benefits. At the same time it filed a claim against the
Subsequent Inquiry Trust Fund ("SITF") seeking reimbursement. SITF
disputed the claim, arguing that the employee suffered only one injury,
which was the bacterial infection.' 7 The State Board and the court of
appeals were unpersuaded.34 The employee's circulatory condition not
only preexisted the bacterial infection, which was aggravated by her job
duties, but it was a permanent impairment which, upon merging with
the infection, resulted in substantially greater impairment.3" Having
met the criteria of a valid claim, the employer and its insurer were
entitled to reimbursement.350
Q. Statute of Limitations
The four statute of limitation cases rendered during the survey period
were evenly split between the one and two year periods. In Borden v.
Holland, 1 a case discussed above, the employee initially injured his

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id. at 214, 444 S.E.2d at 593.
Id. at 215, 444 S.E.2d at 593.
211 Ga. App. 700, 440 S.E.2d 89 (1994).
Id. at 700, 440 S.E.2d at 89.
Id., 440 S.E.2d at 91.
Id. at 702, 440 S.E.2d at 92.
Id.
Id.
212 Ga. App. 820, 442 S.E.2d 916 (1994).

574

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

back on June 9, 1990. He was out of work for approximately two months
and was paid under a salary continuation plan. Although Holland
initially stated on his claim form that the disability was work-related,
he subsequently changed it to reflect that it was not work-related. He
returned to his regularly duties, working until his back pain forced him
to quit on August 18, 1990.5 His claim was filed on August 5, 1991.
The A.J ruled it was timely, but the Full Board reversed, finding it was
barred by the one year statute of limitations. The Full Board's decision
was affirmed by operation of law."' The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the Full Board failed to address the AL's finding that
Holland's date of accident was actually August 18, 1990, the last day he
worked.'
Although the court held that the Full Board's failure to
address the possibility of a fictional "new accident" resulted in no
evidence in the record to support the denial of benefits, this seems rather
unusual."
The Full Board does not take additional evidence, and
merely gives de novo review to the evidence submitted to the AI.J.
Thus, there should have been sufficient evidence in the record to
determine whether Holland's condition deteriorated to the point at which
he could no longer work in August of 1990. If the Full Board found as
a matter of fact that this did not occur, then the court of appeals was
obligated to affirm such a finding under the "any evidence" standard of
review.'
The one year statute was also called into question in Durham v.
Twiggs County Board of Commissioners." Durham injured his right
foot while operating a piece of machinery on June 1, 1988. He missed
no time from work, at least initially, but did seek medical treatment. He
was last seen for complaints of foot pain on August 29, 1988. In
September of 1989, and over a year later, he returned to his personal
physician complaining of an ulceration on the left foot. The physician
referred Durham to a vascular surgeon who had treated him in 1987 for
peripheral vascular disease in both legs.'
When he was seen by the
vascular surgeon on October 2, 1989 Durham had two ischemic ulcers on
his right foot. Conservative care failed and his right lower extremity
was amputated. Durham last worked on October 27, 1989, but waited
until April 2, 1990 to file his claim. The employer defended the claim on
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two grounds. The first defense was that the statute of limitations had
expired with regard to the 1988 accident. The second was that
Durham's disability in October of 1989 was unrelated to that accident
and was instead caused by chronic peripheral vascular disease." 9 The
AIJ and the Full Board agreed and the court of appeals affirmed.'
To prevail Durham needed to prove that his disability beginning in
October of 1989 was at least partially due to the continued performance
of job duties.36 1 In other words, he had to show that there was a
fictional "new accident" on the last day of work. 2 Unfortunately for
Durham, his physician testified that this was not the case.'
The most noteworthy decision involving the two year statute of
limitations period 3" was State v. Barge.'
In Barge, the employee
suffered an injury to his left wrist on September 27, 1988. The treating
physician initially indicated that there was no permanent impairment.
The employee returned to work in February of 1989 on light duties and
worked through July 23, 1990, at which time he took a leave of absence
for health problems. He was terminated shortly thereafter when he
failed to return to work. The treating physician assessed a permanent
partial disability rating on September 27, 1991. 36 When Barge filed
his claim for additional indemnity benefits, the State of Georgia
defended on the grounds that the two year statute of limitations had
expired, and that he had not met his burden of proving that his
disability was causally related to his work injury.67 As to the statute
of limitations defense, the court of appeals held that because permanent
partial disability benefits were "potentially due," the employee's claim
could not be dismissed.'
However, with respect to the request for
temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits, the court
affirmed
the Board's finding that Barge failed to meet his burden of
36 9
proof.

The issue of potentially due benefits was encountered in a second
decision, Watson v. Universal Ceramics, Inc.,37 but this time a differ-
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ent result ensued. Watson suffered an injury to his left arm on
November 13, 1981 which resulted in amputation below the elbow. He
was paid a permanency rating for ninety percent loss of his arm, and
last received indemnity benefits in 1986. In 1989, while working as a
security guard for another employer, Watson began to lose time because
of an "inability to perform his work duties with his right hand due to a
developing arthritis condition."'
On September 15, 1989 he filed for
a hearing requesting benefits based on a change in condition. The AI.J
found that the claim was not time barred because when benefits were
last paid Watson was potentially due additional permanency benefits for
loss of his entire arm. The Full Board reversed, and the superior court
affirmed.3 72 The court of appeals in turn affirmed, noting that "potentially due" meant unpaid benefits in existence during the two year period
after last payment of indemnity benefits.37 3 In this case there were no
such unpaid benefits. 4 Watson did not lose any time prior to September of 1989 because of his left arm."' Furthermore, any increase in
permanency benefits came after a second amputation which took place
in 1990.376

R. Statutory Employer
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-8(c) states that before pursuing a statutory
employer, the employee should first institute his claim against his or her
immediate employer.377
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Southern
Electric, Inc.,' the court of appeals faced a situation in which a
workers' compensation carrier for a statutory employer made payments
to an injured worker of an uninsured subcontractor.3 79 The payments
were made without requiring that the employee first institute a claim
against his immediate employer. When the carrier filed suit for
indemnification, the immediate employer, Southern Electric, defended
on the grounds that this right had been lost because payments had been
made to the employee in complete disregard to the above code sec-
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tion. ° The court of appeals was unimpressed, noting that the "humane purpose of insuring immediate assistance would certainly not be
furthered by holding that a statutory employer waives his right to
recover from the immediate employer if it provides coverage where the
liability is clear without insisting that the claimant first institute formal
proceedings against the immediate employer."
In this case the
immediate employer not only admitted that it had no workers' compensation insurance, although it had consistently misrepresented this fact
to the general contractor prior to the employee's date of injury, but it
assisted in the very investigation which led to payment of benefits." 2
Likewise, the court found very little merit in Southern Electric's
argument that equitable estoppel applied.'
Because the entire
situation was the "result of appellee's misconduct in failing to maintain
workers' compensation coverage and then misrepresenting that it had
such coverage," Southern Electric was in no position to invoke principles
of equity as part of its defense.3 4
In Guillman v. Georgia Power Co.,385 the court of appeals was asked
to decide whether an entity was in fact a statutory employer.'
Guillman, an employee of an independent contractor, was injured at a
Georgia Power plant. 7 He filed a tort claim against Georgia Power,
but the trial court dismissed it on the grounds that he was a statutory
employee of that entity.'
The court of appeals reversed, and citing
a 1993 Georgia Supreme court decision, 9 held that an owner, like
Georgia Power, was not a statutory employer unless it "'also serves as
a contractor for yet another entity and hires another contractor to
perform the work on the premises."' 3 The fact that Georgia Power
had contracts with customers did not suffice.391

Rothrock v. Jeter 92 is important to practitioners not because of the
results, but because of what may have been an oversight by the court of
a 1991 change in the definition of an employee. Rothrock owned a
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tractor-trailer which he leased to C & N Evans Trucking Company.
Jeter, an employee of C & N, was injured while assisting Rothrock in
uncoupling his rig. Jeter received benefits from C & N, and also filed a
tort suit against Rothrock. Rothrock moved for a summary judgment on
the grounds that he was Jeter's fellow employee and, therefore, immune
to tort claims.393 Concluding that Rothrock did not enjoy tort immunity, the court of appeals noted in its decision that he was "'also a
statutory employee of [C & N]."' 4 Effective July 1, 1991, the Georgia
General Assembly modified O.C.G.A. section 34-9-1(2) to the effect that
'an owner-operator as such term is defined in Code Section 40-2-87 shall
be deemed to be an independent contractor.'
Assuming the accident
occurred after July 1, 1991, Rothrock, an owner-operator, was definitely
an independent contractor. Furthermore, he could not have been a
statutory employee of C & N.
S.

Sufficiency of Award
A misstatement of significant testimony is grounds "Tor a referral
back to the board of an award otherwise supported by evidence where it
is possible that a proper understanding of the evidence might have
caused the finder of fact to reach a different conclusion."'
In
Stevens, the superior court reversed a denial of benefits by the State
Board on the grounds that the ALJ's award reportedly "contained several
grossly misstated facts."3 The court of appeals, after reviewing each
of the reported misstatements, disagreed and reversed, upholding the
Board's finding that the employee failed to show he suffered an accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment.'
The fact that
the ALJ specifically found that the employee failed to give notice to his
supervisor on the date of the accident was not a significant misstatement
even though the supervisor was on vacation that day.'
The record
reflected prior accidents by the employee in which he gave notice to his
supervisor of each, as well as a statement to the effect that his
"superiors did not recall appellee ever giving notice of a work-related
injury allegedly sustained on or about February 20th.' ° In a subse-
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quent conversation, and at a time when the employee was having
noticeable physical problems, he never mentioned that they were from
a work-related accident."' Additionally, and with regard to the AI's
finding that "none of the treating physicianshad any reference in their
notes that this was a workers' compensation claim or that the claimant
had been injured on the job,'" the employee argued that his chiropractor
made such a notation.'
The court, focusing solely on the term
"physician," rejected this contention, holding that a chiropractor was not
a physician under the laws of Georgia and, as such, could not be the
employee's treating "physician.' ° By strictly construing the definition
of physician the court found that the evidence did not contradict the
AU's findings." A review of the facts set forth in the decision reveals
that the case could have gone the other way. However, if there is any
evidence to support the Board's findings, the appellate courts, including
the superior court, are bound to affirm.' 5
V. CONCLUSION
Apart from the developments discussed above, practitioners should
keep a watchful eye on the effect of the national health care reform
debate on workers' compensation. At the time this Article was written,
the issue of whether or not to include workers' compensation in a
national health care reform package, although heavily debated by
various lobbying groups during the work by the Clinton health care task
force, had been lost among the debate surrounding universal coverage
and employer mandates. Certainly, the entry of managed care into
Georgia's workers' compensation system will have a dramatic effect on
medical treatment for compensable injuries. It remains to be seen
whether or not workers' compensation in Georgia, and around the
country, is overtaken by national health care reforms.
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